The U.S.–China trade war is one of the major issues in the field of international political economy. During Trump’s first and second terms, the United States sought to prevent its trade deficit and, at the same time, to curb China’s economic growth which, according to mercantilist theory, could be translated into enhanced military and political power. To this end, Washington imposed heavy tariffs on Chinese imports.
The U.S.–China trade war can be analyzed at the individual, national, and systemic levels. However, this study, focusing on the systemic level, examines the role of institutional/structural power in the U.S. trade war against China. The central question is: which category of factors—individual, national, or systemic—has had the greatest impact on the U.S.–China trade war? According to the author, systemic factors have played a particularly significant role.
The findings indicate that the United States, by virtue of its major security, production, financial, and knowledge structures on the one hand, and its use of the United Nations and its subsidiary institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization on the other, holds an upper hand in the trade war against China. In response, China has pursued a multidimensional strategy—most notably the “dual circulation” policy—as a structural countermeasure to this trade war. This research has been conducted using library resources and analyzed descriptively/explanatorily within the framework of mercantilist theory.